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Abstract
An epidemic carries human and fiscal costs. In the case of imported pandemics,
the first-best solution is to restrict national borders to identify and isolate infected
individuals. However, when that opportunity is not fully seized and there is
no preventative intervention available, second-best options must be chosen. In
this article we develop a system of differential equations that simulate both the
fiscal and human costs associated to different mitigation measurements. After
simulating several scenarios, we conclude that herd immunity (or unleashing the
pandemic) is the worst policy in terms of both human and fiscal cost. We found
that the second-best policy would be a strict policy (e.g. physical distancing
with massive testing) established under the first 20 days after the pandemic,
that lowers the probability of infection by 80%. In the case of the US, this strict
policy would save more than 239 thousands lives and almost $170.8 billion to
taxpayers when compared to the herd immunity case.
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1. Introduction
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many policymakers are usually facing two
separated sources of information: economic models that usually predict an
economic collapse [15] and epidemic models that focus on death counts [12].
However, both the economic and mortality figures are key policy variables during
a pandemic but few articles integrate both approaches [9, 16]. In particular, no
research (to our knowledge) has analyzed both the fiscal and mortality impact
of different mitigation measurements. In this article we strive to fill that gap
by approximating the impact of physical distancing and patient care on the
death toll and government budget, in a attempt to find the optimal conditions
to balance it all.
Vaccination or therapeutics can eradicate epidemics from the population, like
the case of smallpox [2, 3] but when a newly discovered virus hits the population,
the entire world is at risk because everyone is susceptible as in the case of the
novel SARS-CoV-2 that is impacting us in 2020 [13]. In the case of an imported
infection (i.e. not an endemic epidemic), the first-best strategy would be to
control borders, identify, treat and isolate infected individuals. This occurred
in the U.S. with the Ebola virus, which never became an epidemic [7]. But
when a virus is already circulating in a territory and there is no antidote or
massive testing and contact tracing available, social or physical distancing is an
alternative to mitigate a pandemic and provide the scientific community time
to research and find alternative measures such as an effective treatment or a
vaccine. Also, physical distancing measure gives fragile healthcare systems the
leverage to take care of chronically ill patients without saturation of existing
capacity. What are the fiscal and human costs of all these measurements in the
short and long run?
Thus, two research questions drive this study: What is the optimal physical
distancing policies in a country and what are the implications of these policies
for both the government budget and loss-of-life? We constructed an enhanced
mathematical SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) epidemic model [5] to
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simulate the COVID-19 epidemic in the US in an attempt to estimate the fiscal
impact and the optimal conditions to mitigate this ongoing pandemic. We found
that a policy of no physical distancing or a race towards herd immunity is not
the optimal policy choice when both human and fiscal costs are considered.
In Section 2 we lay out our methodology. In Section 3 we show the dynamics
associated to our calibrated system of differential equations. In Section 4 we
discuss our results and in Section 5 we conclude and recommend public policies.
2. Methodology
We first describe a simple economy with three sectors; businesses, government,
and a household sector with two actors. In the second part of this section we
describe our epidemic model.
2.1. A Simple Economy
In this economy, the household sector is mobile within the country and is
composed of L workers and U individuals that are not working. Thus, employment
is less than full. This characterization allows us to consider the supply shocks
associated to the COVID-19 pandemic [10], where laborers are impeded to work
fully because of lock-downs or infections affecting members of the household
sector.
Firms produce goods and services i, which require X amount of L. A fixed
amount of total output y is predetermined to be produced in period t=0 and
is given by, y =
∑
Xi ∗ Li. However, firms are able to adjust its output when
external changes hit the labor stock. The total output that considers the impact
of such external changes is observed in, Yt = yHt where Ht = dL/dt.
We hold the following assumptions over H:
• if physical distancing is implemented at t=1, Ht = −0.3 during the physical
distancing. When the physical distancing ends in t=n, and Ht=n = 0.1
This setting let us capture the V-shape growth that is being projected [11]
in the post-COVID-19 period.
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• if no physical distancing is implemented, the pandemic ends in t=n+j,
Ht=n+j+1 = 0, and Ht<j = −0.1. This decline is lower than the lower
bound estimate of fourteen percent decline in output constructed by JP
Morgan for the U.S., a country that did not declare a general lock-down
[15]. In our case, n+j+1 equals 500 days.
• if physical distancing is implemented late at t=i, with j<i, Ht = −0.3
during the physical distancing, Ht=n = 0.1 when the physical distancing
gets relaxed, the pandemic ends in t=n+i. In our case, n+i equals 600
such that Ht>600 = 0.
On the other hand, the government sector has a fixed level of expenditures
predetermined in period t=0, that includes money transfers to low-income U.
Tax revenues C are governed by,
C = τYt
where τ is the tax rate. If there is a pandemic, the government spends Mv
in the treatment of each infected individuals.
2.2. Epidemic model
In order to assess the fiscal impact that a pandemic such as COVID-19 will
convey by the epidemic dynamics we construct an epidemic model, with the
addition of a fiscal impact differential equation based on the previous section
that quantifies the impact in the budget of the country. The epidemic model
is a typical SIR-type model with the epidemiological classes needed for the
evolution of COVID-19 within the population. There are six epidemiological
classes defined Susceptible (S) individuals that progress to incubate the virus
in the Exposed (E) class when they have an effective contact with an infected
symptomatic individual (I) with probability βSIN using mass action or if a
Susceptible individual had contact with an Asymptomatic (A) individual with a
lower probability of infection than a contact with a symptomatic governed by
the factor βSµAN . Treated individuals (T) are assumed to be quarantined, hence,
they are not considered to be able to transmit the diseases in the context of
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this modelling approach. After 14 days of incubating the virus a proportion of
individuals becomes symptomatic and the rest are asymptomatic (estimated here
at 35% [1]). Infected individuals that are asymptomatic recover without further
complications, symptomatic individuals that get critically ill seek treatment
while the mild cases recover. Following the related literature cited in Table 1
below, symptomatic and treated individuals have a probability of dying due to
health complications estimated at 3%. In Table 1 below there is a description of
the parameters used.
2.3. System of Ordinary Differential Equations
The system of differential equations for COVID-19, is now presented in
Equations 1 to 6. In particular, the system is described as:
S˙ = −βS(I + µA)
N
(1)
E˙ =
βS(I + µA)
N
− αE (2)
A˙ = αqE − γA (3)
I˙ = α(1− q)E − (+ δ + σ)I (4)
T˙ = I − (δ + φ)T (5)
R˙ = σI + φT + γA (6)
D˙ = δ(I + T ) (7)
G˙ = τyHt −MvT +MpP ∗D (8)
next couple of sections.
Equation 8 states the changes in the government budget G caused by the tax
revenues C collected in time t, minus the cost of treatment Mv multiplied by
the number of treated individuals T in time t, plus the cost of money transfers
Mp that the government invested to help the fraction P of dead individuals
δ(I + T ) that had low incomes. In other words, the last terms accounts for the
fiscal savings that the government obtain when poor individuals die during the
5
Parameter Description Value Reference
β Rate of infection 0.8 [17]
f(t) Reduction of infection due
to measures implemented
over a time period t.
(0,1] refer to Equation 10 Variable
µ Increase or decrease of
asymptomatic rate of infec-
tion
0.5 Estimated
α Incubation period 14 days [17]
q Probability of been asymp-
tomatic
35% [1]
γ Recovery rate of asymp-
tomatic
14 days [17]
 Rate of hospitalization
(critical illness)
20% Estimated
φ Recovery rate after treated
(hospital discharge)
14 days Estimated
σ recovery rate (mild cases
no hospitalization needed)
14 days Estimated
δ Death rate due to illness 3%/365 [17]
τ Tax rate 0.24 [4]
y GDP 21.73 trillion divided by
365 days
BEA
Ht changes in the labor stock .5 during physical distanc-
ing, 1.06 afterwards or 0.7
if no physical distancing is
ever implemented)
Mv Cost of treatment 2,294 average treatment di-
vided by average days
[14]
Mp money transferred by the
government to low-income
individuals
22,265 [18]
P Fraction of dead individ-
uals who received money
transfer from the govern-
ment
0.8 of victims received
transfers. About 80% of
dead individuals are elder
and we assume that there
is no disproportion of low-
income persons in other
ages.
[19, 20]
Table 1: Parameters of the Epidemiological and Fiscal dynamic model for COVID-19 and the
USA budget.
pandemic.
6
The parameter values in our table were taken from a recollection of the events
developing on COVID-19 and the literature. Perturbations around the means
showed in Table 1 may affect the quantitative magnitude of our figures, but
results are qualitatively similar after such perturbations. In other words, our
findings for the second-best scenarios are robust to deviations of our parameters:
such deviations will largely scale up or down the quantitative aspects of each
scenario.
2.4. Basic reproductive number
The parameters of the model were fitted or estimated to maintain a basic
reproductive number relatively close to 3.8. For comparison purposes lets note
that the <0 of seasonal influenza ranges approximately within 1.7 to 2.1 [21].
For the 2009 influenza A-H1N1 the <0 was estimated to be between 1.2 to 1.6.
In particular, the basic reproductive number <0 is the number of secondary
cases a single infectious individual generates during the period of infectivity on
a completely susceptible population. We assume that the entire population is
susceptible such that S ≈ N and that the epidemic has not started in t=0. The
individuals that can potentially infect the population in our model are infected
individuals that are either symptomatic or asymptomatic. Treated individuals
are assumed to be quarantined. Following the related literature [22], we use the
next generation operator to compute the <0 . Let the vector F be the rate of
new infections flowing to the latent compartment and the vector V to be the
rate of transfer of individuals out of the compartment that are able to transmit
the disease. Then, using our SIR system of equations we define
F =

β S+µIN
0
0
 and V =

αE
−qαE + γA
−(1− q)αE + (+ δ + σ)I

In order to compute <0, let the gradient of F be defined as F =
[
∂F
∂E ,
∂F
∂A ,
∂F
∂I
]
and let the gradient of V be define as V =
[
∂V
∂E ,
∂V
∂A ,
∂V
∂I
]
then we get:
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F =

0 µβ β
0 0 0
0 0 0
 and V =

α 0 0
−qα γ 0
−(1− q)α 0 (+ δ + σ)

Then <0 is the spectral radius of the second generation operator ρ(FV−1)
also know as the dominant eigenvalue of the matrix FV−1. Hence,
FV−1 =

0 µβ β
0 0 0
0 0 0


1
α 0 0
q
γ
1
γ 0
1−q
δ+σ+ 0
1
δ+σ+

=

β[µq(δ+σ+)−γq+γ]
γ(δ+σ+)
µ
γ
1
(δ+σ+)
0 0 0
0 0 0

Then the dominant eigenvalue of FV−1 is ρ(FV−1) = β[µq(δ+σ+)−γq+γ]γ(δ+σ+) , which
means that the basic reproductive number is:
<0 = β [µq(δ + σ + )− γq + γ]
γ(δ + σ + )
(9)
Our intention in this article is to study the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic
in an attempt to estimate the optimal conditions to mitigate the fiscal and
mortality impact associated to this pandemic. Thus, the stability of the system
and equilibrium points will not be addressed, only the <0 was computed. We
focused our efforts on simulating scenarios, which are presented in the next set
of sections.
3. Physical distancing dynamics generalization
In order to go through the methodology of our simulations we lay out simple
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scenarios where we represent the effect of implementing public health policies
such as physical distance dynamics within our model. In order to simulate the
effect of reducing the infection rate by lowering the contact rate within the
population, we modulate the infection ratio β with a time dependent piece-wise
continuous function Equation 10, f(t), that lowers the infection rate for time
tpdOn where physical distancing policies are implemented and raise the infection
rate after time tpdOff . This late increase of the infection rate is not to its full force
because we need to account for the measures taken by the population to prevent
infections such as using mask and being more sanitized until a determined time
t∗ that either restarts physical distance measures or is the end of the simulated
period. See Appendix A for an example on the physical distancing mechanism.
f(t) =

1, 0 ≤ t < tpdOn, No physical distancing
[0.10, 0.50], tpdOn ≤ t ≤ tpdOff , Physical distancing
[0.75, 0.90], tpdOff < t < t
∗, Measures relaxed
(10)
4. Fiscal and Mortality implications under physical distancing sce-
nario: The Case of the US
We simulate the effects of varying infection rates in the total population of
the US. In the case shown in Figure 1, we assume that distancing policies are
implemented two days after the start of the epidemic. The grey line illustrates
the effect of varying the probability of infection within the population: first the
probability is reduced by 90% for four weeks due to an extreme measure (e.g.
because of a lock-down with quick massive testing), then is relaxed to 50% for
eight weeks, then two cycles of extreme measurement for four weeks followed by
a relaxation of 25% for 8 weeks and onward. This 25% reduction in the original
infection rate β assumes that people are more careful and take personal decisions
to avoid infections. The black line, on the other hand, represents the case when
no physical distancing measures are ever implemented.
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Figure 1: Alternated physical distancing starting two days after the epidemic, as described on
Table 2.
Fiscal and death figures are affected by the number of individuals that
circulate in the economy. The top left graph illustrates the symptomatic cases
based on the modulation of the physical distancing measures, as shown in the
bottom left graph. Note that in the case of no physical distance or herd immunity,
the infections grow faster and earlier than in the modulated case, as shown by
the black line. Because the government has to treat those cases in a fast-track
basis, the fiscal impact of no physical distance is reflected earlier than in the
case of alternated physical distance. Note that the economies obtained by the
government when low-income individuals who receive money transfers die are
not sufficient to offset the fiscal losses associated with the pandemic. Human
costs also come up earlier in the case of no distancing, as shown in the bottom
right graph where cumulative dead cases are illustrated in Figure 1.
In the long run, herd immunity has a higher death toll and implies more
government expenditures than the alternated intensity of physical distancing, as
shown in Table 2. In particular, with no physical distancing would die 10,689
more individuals than in the alternated scenario and the government would lose
$1.16 trillion more than in the varying physical distancing. Note that under the
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alternated scenario scientists have approximately 400 days to find an antidote
with a very low number of victims, vis-a-vis 150 days under the no distancing
case.
Figure 2: Varying physical distancing starting two days after the epidemic: lowering the
infection rate 20% for four-week intervals and increasing it between 50% to 75% for eight weeks
intervals as described on Table 2.
Reduction in probability of infection CumulativeDeath cases Budget after 800 days
No measures 239,646 $2,090,225,896,159
20% for 4 weeks,50% for 8 weeks 228,956 $3,106,451,634,585
20% for 4 weeks,75% for 8 weeks (twice)
75% afterwards
10% for 4 weeks,50% for 8 weeks 228,957 $3,249,326,371,355
10% for 4 weeks,75% for 8 weeks (twice)
75% afterwards
20% for 8 weeks,50% for 4 weeks 228,946 $2,609,322,982,259
20% for 8 weeks,75% for 4 weeks (twice)
75% afterwards
60% for 800 days 212,539 $464,708,870,047
20% for 800 days 0 $2,260,976,930,754
Table 2: Cumulative death cases and fiscal impact of Figure 1, 2, and 3
On Figure 2, we illustrate the simulated figures that are obtained when we
shorten the length of the cycles showed previously. Here we are also holding
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the assumption that the pandemic started in day two. The variation in the
probability of infection is shown in the gray line, which goes first to an extreme
reduction of 80% for four weeks, then is relaxed to 50% for eight weeks, then
two cycles of extreme measurement for four weeks followed by a relaxation of
25% for eight weeks and onward. The black line here also illustrates the case
when no physical distancing measures are ever implemented.
Similar to Figure 1, here the black line peaks first while the restriction on
population mobility postpones and lowers the infection curve. The final amounts
for cumulative deaths and the budget are presented on Table 2. We observed
that the strict alternated scenario of Figure 1 would save the federal government
$142.9 billion more than in the relaxed scenario of Figure 2, while mortality
is virtually the same. In other words, the distancing cycles shown in Table 2
appear to be less optimal than in the more restrictive case of Table 2.
Figure 3: Changing week length to the case of Figure 2
What would be the effect of holding the same levels of distancing but changing
the length under each regime? In particular, if we enhance the period under
the restrictive infection and shorten the relaxation in each cycle, how would the
death toll and the fiscal cost change?
In Figure 3 we observe that the peak of infection is postponed further when
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compared to the regime of Figure 2, leaving close to 100 days more for the
development of an antidote. If no antidote is ever found in 500 days, under these
enhanced cycles 10 fewer people would die than in the case of Figure 2 where
the same probabilities of infection are assumed. However, in the case of the cost
that this pandemic represents to the federal budget, this restrictive regime of
Figure 3 costs $497.1 more billion than in the cycles of Figure 2.
Figure 4: Effects of persistent distancing after day two of the pandemic
Reduction in probability of infection CumulativeDeath cases Budget after 800 days
No measures 239,646 $2,090,225,896,159
60% for 800 days 212,539 $464,708,870,047
20% for 800 days 0 $2,260,976,930,754
Table 3: Cumulative death cases and fiscal impact of persistent and early distancing of Figure
4
If we let the probability of infection to be lessened by 80% of distancing
to be in place for the whole period, then virtually no one would die out of
COVID-19. This persistent measure would save 239,646 lives with respect
to what would have occurred without health policies. However, if the same
persistent distancing reduced the probability of infection by 40%, mortality
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would be 27,107 lower than the herd immunity scenario. In the case of the fiscal
costs of the different alternatives, budget is presented in Table 3. Since there
is no infection curve in the restrictive and permanent case, the budget of the
government is mostly affected by the decline in tax revenues caused by lowered
economic output. However, when infection rate is lowered just by 40%, the
government budget becomes highly impacted after day 400: once infection starts
to increase, the public sector is affected by both spending more in treatment
and by the reduction in tax revenues caused by the economic collapse. In the
case of no physical distancing, even though economic output decreased, the
federal budget is highly reduced by the treatment cost. At the end, if there is an
opportunity to implement a persistent and early public health policy, it would
be better to do it intensely (e.g. by combining a strong physical distance with
massive testing): otherwise, the relatively human and fiscal cost would increase
significantly.
How would the figures change if the persistent measure is implemented late?
The evolution of infection and mortality is similar, but there are differences in
the long run for the associated fiscal costs. When the infection is reduced by
40% or 80%, the associated cost of the pandemic to the government decreased
by $51.4 billion than when the public health policy is implemented earlier like
in Figure 4. This difference arises because the economy was not halted during
the first weeks of the pandemic. That is, even in the case of these late decisions
the government is better off in implementing the strict measure: death toll does
not change while fiscal costs perform much either in day 2 or day 20 after the
pandemic (See Appendix B).
In Figure 5 we show the effects of lowering the probability of infection within
the whole U.S. population for different time intervals. When infection is reduced
by 90% for eight weeks, mortality is 10,713 lower than in the herd immunity
case and the fiscal cost of the pandemic is the minimum with respect to any of
the scenarios presented in this article. That is, this short and strong distancing
policy would have a lower death toll (24 deaths) than in the alternated scenario
of Figure 1, but with a lowered fiscal cost ($180.3 billion less).
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Figure 5: Varying probability of infection between 10% and 50% with different time intervals,
two days after the pandemic
Reduction in probability of infection CumulativeDeath cases Budget after 600 days
No physical distancing 239,646 $2,090,225,900,896
10% for 8 weeks 228,933 $3,429,605,751,038
50% for 24 weeks 228,941 $2,789,411,480,863
Table 4: Cumulative death cases and fiscal impact of varying probability of infection between
10% and 50% with different time intervals of Figure 5
If the infection rate is reduced by 50% for twenty four weeks, the death toll
is a bit higher than in the case of a strong policy for eight continuous weeks. In
either case, the pandemic would kill at least 10,705 fewer individuals than in
the herd immunity case. In terms, of budget, the longer period under distancing
induces a larger fiscal decline than in the case of the eight-week distancing.
However, the herd immunity is again the most costly option in terms of both
death and government budget.
These results reveal that if a policymaker is going to implement distancing
measures, overall better results would be found with a strict measure for a short
period than with a weak measure for a long period. In fact, in terms of human
and fiscal costs, we can state that this strong policy for eight continuous weeks
15
is the preferred option after the case of Figure 6.
Figure 6: Effects of persistent distancing implemented in day 20 of the pandemic.
Reduction in probability of infection CumulativeDeath cases Budget after 800 days
No measures 239,646 $2,090,225,896,159
60% 212,539 $516,145,614,624
20% 0 $2,312,415,608,494
Table 5: Cumulative death cases and fiscal impact of persistent but late distancing on Figure 6
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
A challenge that policymakers face during a pandemic is to save lives at
the minimum fiscal costs. In the case of COVID-19, the first-best policy to
minimize human and fiscal costs would be reached by identifying, treating,
and isolating incoming infected individuals. When this opportunity is missed,
second-best policies need to be searched. We conclude that, when both fiscal
and human costs are equally relevant, the second-best policy is reached when
policies to significantly reduce the transmission rate are taken. In particular,
if the transmission rate is lowered by 80%, either in day 2 or day 20 after the
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beginning of the pandemic (see Appendix B) , both human and fiscal costs
associated to the pandemic are minimized with almost no dead cases and $2.57
trillion in net impact to the government budget. These early policies can take
the form of physical distancing combined with massive testing.
The third best policy is found when a strong lock-down or similar policy
reduced the infection rate by 90% for eight weeks. If one focuses only on money
disregarding life, this policy is the second-best policy: the pandemic would
cost approximately $1.4 trillion. The fourth best policy is to alternate physical
distancing measures: strict distancing for four weeks followed by a mild relaxation
of eight weeks, then two cycles of returning to strict distancing for four weeks
followed by eight weeks of relaxation.
Unleashing the pandemic without taking any containment policy does not
minimized the fiscal cost of the pandemic in any of our several simulations,
except for the case when the transmission rate is reduced mildly. But even when
compared to that case of a permanent reduction of 40% to the infection rate,
this herd immunity case still results in 27,107 more lives lost. This is because
the race towards herd immunity always had the greatest human costs. In fact,
at the time of our writing, scientists cannot clearly state that immunity is found
after surviving the infection [8, 6].
We do not consider what type of fiscal policy can be implemented to counteract
the fiscal costs associated to the pandemic. Instead, we attempt to identify the
cost of the pandemic and, from that amount, fiscal policies can be tailor-made
to address specific needs.
We acknowledge that our model may not be exported to developing countries
where the lock-down can also result in deaths of individuals from starvation:
given the low safety nets and salaries in many poor countries, lack of employment
can severely reduce dietary intake resulting in other serious health-related issues
or death. In that case, we recommend adding a death variable associated to
forced unemployment. Such an approach exceeds the scope of this paper.
17
6. Acknowledgments
We like to thanks Dr. Ricardo González-Méndez from the University of
Puerto Rico School of Medicine as well as Dr. Ricardo J. Cordero-Soto from
California Baptist University for their insights and suggestions. The usual
disclaimers apply.
7. Disclosure
• Both authors contributed equally in the designed, codification and prepa-
ration of the article. All authors have approved the final article.
• This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in
the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
• Declarations of interest: none
References
[1] A. Azad. Cdc estimates that 35% of coronavirus patients don’t
have symptoms. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/22/health/
cdc-coronavirus-estimates-symptoms-deaths/index.html, 2020.
[Published: May 22, 2020, accessed: May 27, 2020].
[2] H. Bazin and E. Jenner. The eradication of smallpox. Elsevier, 2000.
[3] Abbas M Behbehani. The smallpox story: life and death of an old disease.
Microbiological reviews, 47(4):455, 1983.
[4] D. Bradbury and M. Harding. Revenue statistics 2019 - the
united states, [oecd]. https://www.https://www.overleaf.com/
project/5e827586525d6d00011c9841oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/
revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf, 2019. [Online; accessed
29-April-2020].
18
[5] Fred Brauer. Compartmental models in epidemiology. In Mathematical
epidemiology, pages 19–79. Springer, 2008.
[6] WHO Scientific Brief. Immunity passports in the context of
covid-19. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/
immunity-passports-in-the-context-of-covid-19, 2020. [Published:
April 24, 2020, accessed: May 7, 2020].
[7] CDC. 2014-2016 ebola outbreak in west africa. https://www.cdc.
gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html#anchor_
1515001446180, 2019. [Page last reviewed: March 8, 2019, accessed: May
6, 2020].
[8] C. Dwyer. No evidence yet that recovered covid-19 pa-
tients are immune, who says. https://www.npr.org/
sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/25/844939777/
no-evidence-that-recovered-covid-19-patients-are-immune-who-says,
2020. [Published: April 25, 2020, accessed: May 7, 2020].
[9] M. S. Eichenbaum, S. Rebelo, and M. Trabandt. The macroeconomics of
epidemics. (w26882), 2020.
[10] Veronica Guerrieri, Guido Lorenzoni, Ludwig Straub, and Iván Werning.
Macroeconomic implications of covid-19: Can negative supply shocks cause
demand shortages? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research,
2020.
[11] IMF. World economic outlook, april 2020: The great lock-
down. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/
14/weo-april-2020, 2020. [Published: April, 2020, accessed: May, 2020].
[12] Akhmetzhanov A.R. Hayashi-K. Linton N.M. Yang Y. Yuan B. Kobayashi
T. Kinoshita R. Jung, S.M. and H. Nishiura. Real-time estimation of the
risk of death from novel coronavirus (covid-19) infection: Inference using
exported cases. Journal of clinical medicine, (2):523, 2020.
19
[13] Chih-Cheng Lai, Tzu-Ping Shih, Wen-Chien Ko, Hung-Jen Tang, and Po-
Ren Hsueh. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (sars-cov-2)
and corona virus disease-2019 (covid-19): the epidemic and the challenges.
International journal of antimicrobial agents, page 105924, 2020.
[14] L. Levitt, K. Schwartz, and E. Lopez. Estimated cost of
treating the uninsured hospitalized with covid-19, (kff, [april
7, 2020]). https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/
estimated-cost-of-treating-the-uninsured-hospitalized-with-covid-19/,
2020. [Online; accessed 29-April-2020].
[15] JP Morgan. Assessing the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic. https:
//www.jpmorgan.com/global/research/coronavirus-impact. [Online;
accessed 29-April-2020].
[16] Itay Katzir Avi Mayo Yael Korem Boaz Dudovich Eran Yashiv Amos J.
Zehavi Nadav Davidovich Ron Milo Uri Alon Omer Karin Yinon M. Bar-On,
Tomer Milo. Adaptive cyclic exit strategies from lockdown to suppress
covid-19 and allow economic activity. 2020.
[17] Kiesha Prem, Yang Liu, Timothy W Russell, Adam J Kucharski, Rosalind M
Eggo, Nicholas Davies, Stefan Flasche, Samuel Clifford, Carl AB Pearson,
James D Munday, et al. The effect of control strategies to reduce social
mixing on outcomes of the covid-19 epidemic in wuhan, china: a modelling
study. The Lancet Public Health, 2020.
[18] Congressional Budget Spending. Federal spending on the elderly and chil-
dren. https://https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/23xx/doc2300/fsec.pdf, 2020. [Online; accessed 29-April-2020].
[19] Deborah L Thompson, Jessica Jungk, Emily Hancock, Chad Smelser,
Michael Landen, Megin Nichols, David Selvage, Joan Baumbach, and Mack
Sewell. Risk factors for 2009 pandemic influenza a (h1n1)–related hospital-
ization and death among racial/ethnic groups in new mexico. American
journal of public health, 101(9):1776–1784, 2011.
20
[20] Andrea C Tricco, Erin Lillie, Charlene Soobiah, Laure Perrier, and Sharon E
Straus. Impact of h1n1 on socially disadvantaged populations: systematic
review. PLoS One, 7(6), 2012.
[21] James Truscott, Christophe Fraser, Wes Hinsley, Simon Cauchemez, Christl
Donnelly, Azra Ghani, Neil Ferguson, and Aronrag Meeyai. Quantifying the
transmissibility of human influenza and its seasonal variation in temperate
regions. PLoS currents, 1, 2009.
[22] Pauline Van den Driessche and James Watmough. Reproduction numbers
and sub-threshold endemic equilibria for compartmental models of disease
transmission. Mathematical biosciences, 180(1-2):29–48, 2002.
Appendix A. Physical Distance Mechanism
Let’s look at Figure A.7 to explain the mechanism of the physical distance
modulation. In this graph we vary the time length and the ratio of the infection
to simulate the effect of alternating physical distancing measures. The top
panel on Figure A.7 is the dynamic of the symptomatic cases I, where the black
plot represents the scenario where no measures are applied hence there is no
physical distancing f(t) = 1 for all t to account for 100% contact rate, the gray
graph is the one applying physical distancing as shown in the bottom graph that
represents our piece-wise function f(t).
In this example we start physical distancing measures on day 20 (i.e. tpdOn =
20 after the start of the epidemic) and lower the transmission rate 50% for two
weeks (i.e. tpdOff = 34 two weeks after implemented + tpdOn = 20). Then,
measures are relaxed for two weeks. At this time the infection rate is decreased
by 10%, assuming people are a little bit more careful by washing their hands or
using cloth masks. After these two weeks, when cases start to increase again,
the physical distancing measures are taken more strictly, thereby decreasing the
infection rate by 70% for six weeks. Thus, we found the famous "flatten the curve"
scenario in which we all desire to maintain our health system unsaturated. If a
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Figure A.7: The effect of alternate physical distancing measures on the epidemic curve.
vaccine or effective treatment is not implemented before the physical measures
are lifted, the epidemic will raise again.
Appendix B. Other Physical Distance Scenarios
A policymaker would like to find an easier mechanism than a cyclical regime to
combat the pandemic. In Figure B.8 we show the case where just one restrictive
policy that declines the infection rate by 80% is applied for 250 days. The
probability of infection is then kept by a permanent reduction of 25% to account
for people being more careful and taking measures to avoid being infected. In
this case the peak of the distancing curve arrives much later than before at
approximately day 600. As expected, more lives (26 persons) are saved than in
the alternated cycles of Figure 2 but now the federal budget is almost halved.
Note that in any of these scenarios, no physical distance or herd immunity is an
optimal solution, either in terms of human or fiscal cost.
22
Figure B.8: Distancing of 20% for 250 days after the pandemic, followed by 75% distancing.
Reduction in probability of infection CumulativeDeath cases Budget after 800 days
No measures 239,646 $2,090,225,896,159
20% for 250 days then 75% 228,930 $2,460,890,014,613
Table B.6: Cumulative death cases and fiscal impact of the regime in Figure B.8
23
